Cheating: The Malware for Video Games

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


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SOPHOS

- Seen a lot of malware, started digging into cheats
- Cheat: Software for changing an online, competitive game real-time
- Pretty similar to malware
 - Methods
 - o Economy: cheat groups and anti-cheat companies an arms race for 15 years
- Sophisticated solutions:
 - o behind security industry, but comparable
- Topics
 - o Why cheat?
 - o How do cheats work?
 - o How do anti-cheats work?

Cheat Basics

- Online game:
 - Many players connected by a server
 - Mutual game state computed
- Cheater (attacker) is one of the players
- Goal: unfair advantage

Anti-Cheat Basics

- ~10 anti-cheat solutions, by different companies
- Two components: on server and client
- Client component is compiled together with the game
- Inherent weakness: attacker has control over the client
- Heavy obfuscation: code and memory content
- Most of the cheat is for bypassing, small portion is the payload

Why Cheat?




Evolution of Attackers

- First for fun
- Industry grows
- Games go online
- Cheat for profit
- Anti-Cheat development

An Ideal Platform

- Profitable
 - In-game money = Real money



Accounts can be sold for up to \$5000



- Options:
 - Win valuable things in-game
 - Steal accounts
 - Cheat as a Service

An Ideal Platform

- Performance-sensitive environment
 - o Players expect realistic look, instant reaction
 - Avoid network latencies: distributed computation, data from untrusted clients
- Legal grey zone

Attacks



Old Method: File Injectors

- Change code on disk
- E.g. make textures transparent to see through walls
- Not flexible, updates break it, easy to detect




Uncommon Method: MitM Attack

- Sniffs and modifies data in transit
- Often unencrypted, or key is easily accessible, unsigned packages
- Allows more advanced methods, like timestamp forgery
 - React before the event
- Need to implement large part of the game logic, not practical anymore

Common Method 1: Injection


- Modifies game data or code in memory
- Easy and powerful after deobfuscation
- 1. Access memory: DLL injection, or patching known loaded DLLs
- 2. Find relevant structure
- Anti-cheat developers are focused on this

Injection Example



Common Method 2: Bots


- In games where mechanical tasks are rewarded
- Goal: Online 24/7
- Sold as a service or used for Botnets
- Big difference in features
 from fishing to complex quests
- Mitigated by behavior analysis



Different Methods: Spam, Phishing

- Not cheat, but related
 - For advertisement or stealing accounts
- Communicate on in-game chat
 - No anti-spam solutions
 - Usually not mitigated at all





Mitigations



Client-side Component

- Responsibility: Supply useful data to the server
- Invasive approaches, spying
- Checks: periodical, on request by server, or on events
- Methods:
 - o Dump all DLLs loaded in-game
 - Screenshot
 - o Full memory scan
 - o Title of all active windows
 - All running process names
 - Start of code section of all running processes
- Approach is mostly signature-based
- Heuristic detection for new cheats

Server-side Component

- Responsible for convictions
- Flag accounts, bans them in waves
- Based on:
 - Data from the client
 - Player behavior
- Behavior-based detection in infancy
 - Distinguish cheaters from very skilled players

Future of Anti-Cheat

- Role of behavioral analysis increasing
- Machine learning

SOPHOS Security made simple.